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BREACH OF FAITH? 
ITALIAN-SOVIET COLD WAR TRADING  
AND ENI’S INTERNATIONAL OIL SCANDAL
By the late-1950s, Soviet oil exports to Western Europe caused widespread 
concern in a number of  Western countries as these feared that Moscow could 
use oil to weaken their economic interests . At the same time though, other 
Western countries had no hesitation in developing trade relations with the So-
viets, seeing this as a good commercial opportunity . The paramount example 
of such political nonchalance was Italy’s oil company, ENI . In 1960, ENI signed 
a barter contract with the Soviets, causing a scandal in the Western oil world: the 
Italian company’s act was seen as a serious breach of faith by its international al-
lies . As a consequence, ENI’s contract became a serious bone of contention in the 
country’s bilateral and international relations . This paper analyzes the origins and 
development of the ENI-Soviet deal, and focuses on the reactions of Italy’s West-
ern allies and the debate it generated at the European Economic Community .
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В конце 1950-х гг . поставки нефти из СССР в Западную Европу вызвали 
озабоченность в некоторых европейских странах, которые опасались, что 
Москва может использовать нефть в целях ослабления их экономических 
интересов . Однако наряду с этим, другие европейские страны продолжали 
поддерживать торговые отношения с Советским Союзом, считая их пер-
спективными . Ярким примером такой политической беспечности стала 
итальянская нефтяная компания ENI (Национальное нефтегазовое уч-
реждение) . В 1960 г . она подписала с СССР соглашение о товарообмене, 
чем вызвала скандал на европейском нефтяном рынке: международные 
союзники восприняли действия итальянской компании как измену . 
В результате контракт ENI стал камнем преткновения в двусторонних 
и многосторонних отношениях Италии с другими странами . В статье 
рассматриваются предпосылки и этапы развития сотрудничества ENI 
и СССР, при этом особое внимание уделяется изучению реакции 
западных союзников Италии и споров, которые это событие вызвало 
в Европейском экономическом сообществе .
Ключевые слова: холодная война; ЕЭС; торговля между Западом 
и Востоком; нефть; СССР; Италия .
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The Communists intend to conquer the Free World through economic 
means . <…> They direct their trade most carefully, with an aim to strengthen 
their industrial machine by the procurement from the Free World of capital 
goods, equipment and machines which they cannot produce . 
Standard Oil of New Jersey’s Statement of position
 on the threat of Communist trade. 
19 Jan 1962
Introduction
The 1950s were the age of ‘elephants’, as large oilfields were known among 
oilmen [Yergin, Ch . 25] . The beginning of this new era was soon perceived 
by the most insightful experts in oil affairs of the time, so that as early as 
1953 Everette DeGolyer, the prominent American geophysicist, could fore-
cast an unexpected and nightmarish turn in the business of large world oil 
companies (also known as ‘the majors’), namely overproduction . The striking 
figures that economic researcher, Daniel Yergin, reports, are self-explanatory 
in this respect; between 1948 and 1972, world oil production increased from 
438 to 2,100 million tons (Mt) a year [Yergin, р . 481–482] .1 Unsurprisingly, 
such colossal production also affected world prices, which between 1954 and 
1970 decreased from $15 to $10 per barrel [Parra, р . 73–74] . 
In his works, historian Timothy Mitchell has shown how in the 1940s 
and for most of the 1950s, the majors tried to, and mostly succeeded in, 
hoarding the world’s most promising areas in terms of oil and gas resources, 
not aiming at increasing production, but at withholding it – a strategy that 
Mitchell called ‘production of scarcity’ , and that they did this in order to 
acquire an oligopoly on hydrocarbons, take away potential resources from 
their competitors, and obtain the power of regulating oil prices [Mitchell 
2009; 2011] . However, by the late 1950s, not only had the growth of na-
tional oil enterprises undermined these plans in a number of areas, but 
several new market factors were putting this approach at risk . Beside the 
emergence of national, and of independent oil companies starting to gnaw 
at the market, one main source of anxiety was represented by the colossal 
amount of oil that the Soviet Union had started extracting and marketing . 
In the mind of many a Western capitalist, Soviet oil threatened to upset the 
international petroleum order . Most of this paper will aim at an analysis of 
the consequences of this factor within Cold War settings . 
Between 1955 and 1965, Soviet oil production more than tripled, 
growing from 71 to 243 million tons (Mt) [Berry, р . 150; Ebel, р . 40; 
Spencer, р . 98] .2 This growth was mainly caused by major oil discov-
1
 Figures here are given in tons per day, whereas in the original source they are expressed 
in barrels per day . 
2 ource reported in Barry’s work: Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic 
Review, “USSR Annual Supplement . 1971” . Vol . 10 .
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eries made in the Ural-Volga region . Soon after the discoveries, the 
crucial issue for the Soviet oil industry became the marketing of the 
newly-found oil, and an immediately conceivable solution was found 
in its exportation to industrially-expanding Western Europe . The ex-
tent to which such low prices were part of an explicit political strategy 
aimed at making Western Europe dependent on the USSR for its en-
ergy, or were rather an economic consequence of the quantities of oil 
found and of the Soviets’ urgent need of Western technologies in ex-
change, has long been debated [Ebel; Hoskins] . Whatever the rationale 
underlying this strategy, everyone agreed on the means chosen by the 
Soviet administration to bring the country’s oil to Europe was straight-
forward: this was to be a highly pronged pipeline system, originating 
in the Ural-Volga fields, which would connect production sites to the 
westernmost brims of the Iron Curtain, and possibly Western Europe . 
Such project, nevertheless, would require a number of advanced tech-
nological artifacts that the Soviets did not have the adequate know-
how or industrial might to produce in the early 1960s, and would have 
to import from abroad . Such technological issues were at the core of 
Western preoccupations, especially at the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization (NATO), where they generated a heated debate in the early 
1960s . Studies on the NATO debate highlight the fragmentary nature 
of trans-Atlantic alliances [Cantoni, 2014; Cantoni, 2016; Högselius]; 
a nature, which was reflected also in other international organizations, 
such as the European Economic Community (EEC) . Rather than oil 
technology, the young European Economic Community was con-
cerned with sheer oil imports from the USSR by a number of West Eu-
ropean countries . Intra-European disputes that occurred at the EEC 
as a consequence of what become widely known in Euro-Atlantic polit-
ical environments as the ‘Soviet oil offensive’ are therefore worth study-
ing, especially since the Community may be seen as a scale model of the 
more general world clash of oil haves and have-nots . 
The Soviet Oil Offensive and The ENI ‘Scandal’
Soviet oil exports or, as it became widely known in the West, ‘the 
Soviet oil offensive’, were part of a larger strategy, in which barter agree-
ments were employed as powerful economic and diplomatic weapons, 
in that they enabled beneficiary countries to find outlets for their pro-
ductions . When trading with Egypt, the Russians bartered oil for cot-
ton; in the case of Cuba, they swapped oil for sugar [Jensen-Eriksen, 
р . 201] .3 Technoscentific expertise was also used as a lever to convince 
developing countries to collaborate . This was a cornerstone of Soviet oil 
policy, and it had been successfully employed in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, 
3
 Source reported: The National Archives, Kew (TNA, henceforth) – POWE33/243, 
“Russian oil imports”, Ministry Of Power, 13 May 1960 .
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Pakistan and Egypt . The Russians provided crews of experts to assist the 
locals with building pipelines and tankers, executing geological studies, 
and training executives of the national oil industry . Indeed, such train-
ing was not limited to technical aspects: it catered for political and social 
engineering .4 
Reactions to the Soviet oil strategy varied from country to country . 
While, expectedly, the American government firmly refused to allow 
Soviet imports into the United States, European positions were more 
diverse, depending heavily on each country’s trading activity with the 
USSR . In terms of Soviet exports, the top three West European coun-
tries in 1957 (the UK, West Germany and France) imported merchandise 
for 756, 286 and 268 million roubles respectively [Bagnato, 2003, р . 97] .5 
In Britain, Harold Macmillan’s government was divided on the issue on 
an oil embargo . It implemented one in 1959, but serious divergences re-
mained between government departments, notably between the Board of 
Trade (against) and the Ministry of Power (in favour) [Jensen-Eriksen, р . 
204] . In France, Victor de Metz, the President of France’s oil flagship, the 
Compagnie française des pétroles, feared that Soviet trade could extend 
to the entire EEC, and hoped an alliance between Arab producers and oil 
majors could stem Soviet oil ‘flooding’ [Catta, р . 209] . The Italians were 
conspicuous by their silence, the reason being that ENI’s trade with the 
USSR was all but insignificant, as were commercial exchanges between 
the Soviets and many large Italian industrial concerns such as FIAT . How-
ever, Italy’s favourable opinion of Soviet oil was to become crystal-clear to 
the rest of the Western world in 1960 .
Indeed by 1960, ENI’s decade-long prospecting efforts had brought 
very scant fruit: Egypt was the only other country where the Italian com-
pany had a considerable oil production, namely 1 .9 Mt of crude oil per 
year (out of ENI’s total production of 2 .5 Mt) [Pozzi, р . 431] . The lack of 
oil findings of considerable magnitude instigated a reassessment of the 
company’s supplying strategy; immediate availability of oil was priori-
tised over long-run exploration programmes . This led to the signing of 
contracts between ENI and the Soviet public monopoly, Soyuznefteex-
port (SNE) . All authors writing about ENI have underlined the signifi-
cance of the agreement signed in October 1960 between the Italians and 
the Soviets, although only diplomatic historian Bruna Bagnato has em-
phasised that that was only a further step in a trade that had started a few 
years earlier [Bagnato] . Since the end of 1958, ENI had agreed to import 
crude oil in exchange for goods and services . The first of these contracts 
bartered oil for synthetic rubber produced by the ENI affiliate, Azienda 
nazionale idrogenazione combustibili (ANIC), under a license owned by 
4
 AHTOTAL – Fonds Total-CFP, b . 90 .4/102 // Revue de presse . 30 . Chronologie des 
accords politiques entre l’URSS et les pays arabes . Dec . 1958; The Reporter, “The Soviet Oil 
Offensive”, by Leon M . Herman, 21 June 1962 .  P . 27 . 
5
 The equivalence is 1957 was 1 rouble = 4 dollars, so the figures reported correspond 
to $3 .02 billion for the UK, $1 .14 billion for West Germany, $1 .07 billion for France . URL: 
http://www .cbr .ru/currency_base/OldVal .aspx  (mode of access: 11 .09 .2015) .
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the American company, Phillips Petroleum .6 In late 1958 ENI’s President, 
Enrico Mattei, secretly met a number of government officials in Moscow, 
including SNE’s President, Evgeniy Gurov, and consolidated the group’s 
relations with the Soviet company, with a view to a large barter deal . 
For ENI, 1958 also marked the beginning of trade relations with another 
important pawn on the geopolitical chessboard: Mao Zedong’s China . In 
1958, Mattei secretly visited the Far Eastern country, the government of 
which had not been recognised by either the Italian government or the 
United Nations (UN) as a result of American pressure . This visit would 
culminate three years later in ENI’s first Chinese trade agreement [Perrone, 
p . 157–158] . It goes without saying that such an intense trade between 
the national company of a NATO member such as Italy, whose Christian 
Democrat (DC) administrations had been struggling for over a decade to 
convince the US of Italy’s reliability notwithstanding the large following 
enjoyed by the Italian Communist Party, and the two most powerful 
Communist countries, was seen as a serious breach of Italy’s commitment 
to the Western camp .  
Transactions between Italy and the Soviet Union did not stop even 
when the Italian Premier, Amintore Fanfani, decided to accommodate US 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles on Italian territory, in spite of vibrant 
Soviet protest .7 Diplomatic historian, Leopoldo Nuti, has argued that the 
deployment of US missiles in Italy was looked favourably on by the Italian 
government as it would give Italy “a nuclear status of some sort and would 
improve its national prestige” [Nuti, p . 369] . However, Fanfani’s decision 
was a clear statement of the dependence of Italian security on American 
goodwill, and was not welcomed by high-ranked diplomats such as Pietro 
Quaroni, the Italian Ambassador in West Germany, who lamented Christian 
Democrat passiveness to US diktats . According to Soviet newspaper, 
Sovetskaya Rossiya, Quaroni would declare on that occasion: “We are 
simply [US] satellites and nothing else” .8 However, I will show that when 
looking at the oil sector and ENI’s moves, Quaroni’s statement sounds way 
too reductive to characterize Italy’s position .
Starting from late 1958, ENI’s dealings won the Italian company US and 
French secret services’ attention . The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and 
the Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage started 
keeping ENI under surveillance, updating their governments in a number 
6
 Archivio Storico ENI, Pomezia (ASENI, henceforth) – Fondo ENI, Estero, Rapporti 
commerciali con l’estero, b . 2, fd . 7E0, ANIC to Rasno-import, 27 Oct. 1958; PPS (1959) 
“Nouvelles brièves”, XXVI (1): 38 . 
7
 Archivio storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Rome (ASMAE, henceforth) – Te-
legrammi ordinari, Russia (Ambasciata Mosca) . 1959 . Vol . 42 arrivo (Jan-May) . N . 10280; 
Italian Embassy (Itemb, henceforth) Moscow (Bounous) to Italian Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs (MAEI, henceforth), ‘Nota sovietica all’Italia sui missili’ . 28 Apr. 1959 . N . 10291; ‘Nota 
sovietica sui missili’, 28 Apr . 1959 . Vol . 43 partenza (Jan-Aug) . N . 5953; MAEI (Straneo) to 
Itemb Moscow, ‘Risposta a Nota sovietica circa missili’, 8 May 1959 .
8
 Quaroni’s quote is from: ASMAE – Telegrammi ordinari, Russia (Ambasciata Mosca), 
1959, vol . 42 arrivo (Jan-May), n . 13480, Itemb Moscow (Pietromarchi) to MAEI . 28 May 
1959 . P . 3 . My own translation . 
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of secret reports .9  Mattei’s travels to Moscow elicited Fanfani’s visit to the 
US Embassy in Rome, where Ambassador James Zellerbach cautioned 
him that Mattei’s acts made it difficult to believe the Italian government 
was aligned with NATO . Fanfani argued that although Mattei’s behaviour 
was risky, he had no means of stopping state companies trading .10 But if he 
had not, who else could have? Fanfani himself must have known that his 
justifications were not wholly convincing . His argument suggested a refusal 
to stop the ENI President’s initiatives . 
A year later Giuseppe Ratti, ENI’s marketing counsellor, also met US 
Embassy staff . In a conversation with its First Secretary, Albert Nyren, 
he described ENI’s contacts with the Soviet Bloc . Nyren stated that Ratti 
had “always been friendly and open to the Embassy representatives” . Ratti 
confirmed ENI-SNE contacts, while clarifying that his company’s future 
purchases would depend on the price offered by the Soviets and on the 
opportunities offered to Italian firms to sell their goods in return .11 By the 
end of 1959, that is by the time Ratti met the US Embassy staff, negotiations 
for the one contract that would cause scandal in the oil world were already 
ongoing, and it is hard to believe Ratti was not aware of the increase in 
ENI’s oil imports from the USSR . 
But Ratti was manoeuvring in a climate of uncertainty . Fanfani’s 
government, which was disposed to an opening to the Socialists, had fallen 
in January 1959, and DC was now controlled by its right wing . The new 
leadership was hostile to public intervention in trade, and this threatened 
Fanfani and Gronchi’s so-called ‘Neo-Atlanticist’ project of asserting a degree 
of autonomy from the USA in foreign policy, which was also endorsed by 
Mattei .12 Without government support, ENI needed to display a favourable 
stance to American diplomats, so as to avoid the consequences of Fanfani’s fall 
and the subsequent changes in government attitude . To sum up, presumably 
Ratti was using his friendly relations with the US Embassy to dispel Americans 
concerns and misrepresent ENI’s ‘oily deals’ with the Soviets . 
9
 Archives Diplomatiques du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, La Courneuve (AD-
MAE, henceforth) – Série: Direction d’Europe (Z-Europe), Sous-série: Italie 1944–1970, fd . 
288, letter, French Embassy (Fremb, henceforth) Rome (Palewski) to French Ministry of Fo-
reign Affairs (MAEF, henceforth), 15 Jan. 1959; National Archive and Records Administra-
tion, College Park (MD) (NARA, henceforth) – RG 59, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, 
b . 2021, f . 456 .9341/11–1958, confidential, American Embassy (Amemb, henceforth) Rome 
(Jernegan) to Secretary of State, 19 Nov. 1958; Amemb Rome (Zellerbach) to Secretary 
of State, 11 Dec. 1958; NARA – Cia Records Search Tool Database (CREST, henceforth), 
Cia, Central Intelligence Bulletin, top secret, 20 Dec. 1958; Archives Nationales, Pierrefit-
te-sur-Seine (AN, henceforth) – b . 19900317/13, fd . 1, sub-fd . Italie 1955/1979, secret, Note 
Sdece, L’activité de l’Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi et de son président (nov. 1958 – avr. 1959), 
11 May 1959, pp . 4, 7, 10–11 (Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA, heceforth) n° 111 382) .
10
 NARA – RG 59, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, b . 3617, f . 765 .13/12-2958, Foreign 
Service Dispatch, Amemb  Rome to Department of State (DS, henceforth), ‘Conversation 
with Prime Minister Fanfani’, 29 Dec. 1958 . 
11
 NARA – RG 59, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, b . 4826, f . 865 .2553/11-359, Fo-
reign Service Dispatch, Amemb Rome to DS, ‘Impressions of ENI’s Marketing Counselor of 
Commercial Prospects of Soviet Bloc Countries’, 3 Nov. 1959 . 
12 Rash political moves by DC’s rightist government would bring Fanfani back to his role 
of Prime Minister in July 1960 . 
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The agreement between ENI and SNE was eventually signed in 
October 1960 by Mattei and the Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade, Nikolai 
Patolichev . Though the conclusion of the deal had been anticipated, its 
size had not, and generated much surprise and disquiet: in fact it caused 
a veritable scandal in the oil world . The Soviets committed to sell ENI 
11 Mt of crude and 1 Mt of fuel oil over four years (1961 to 1964) . 
ENI would provide the Soviets with technological products such as 
synthetic rubber, steel pipes and equipment for pipelines .13 The overall 
deal was worth $100 million in each direction . In February 1961, ENI 
signed a further commercial protocol, which integrated the previous 
one, and covered the period from 1962 to 1965 . Italy would import 
21 .4 Mt of crude oil over the next five years and 700 thousand tons (kt) 
of fuel oil per year .14
Incidentally, two months before the Italian contract, West Germany 
had also signed an important barter contract with the Soviets . German 
exports included plants for chemical and extractive industry, iron and 
steel products, ships and large-diameter pipes; German imports were es-
sentially crude oil and oil products .15 The exchange value was double 
that of the 1960 ENI-SNE agreement, but in itself the German contract 
was seen as less threatening, considering German availability of national 
coal . Italy, on the contrary, had no such supplies, and almost totally de-
pended on oil . Indeed one of the reasons most frequently stated by Ital-
ian officials for buying oil from the USSR was the obligation to source 
energy from abroad; in addition Soviet oil was the cheapest available, 
and Italy was just obeying to market laws when buying Soviet . More-
over, ENI’s production was not sufficient for the growing national en-
ergy needs [Perrone, p . 146–147] . In general, West German trade with 
the USSR rose from $196 .5 million in 1959 to $401 .5 million in 1962 
[Stent, p . 97]; so together with the Italian contract, also the German one 
caused disquiet in the Euro-Atlantic oil circles: in particular it alarmed 
the American secret services . 
13 ASMAE – Telegrammi ordinari, Russia (Ambasciata Mosca), 1960, vol . 59 arrivo 
(Jul . – Dec .), n . 36288, Italian Embassy in Moscow (Itemb Moscow) (Pietromarchi) to 
MAEI, ‘Contratto ENI-Finsider’, 3 Oct . 1960; n . 37331, Itemb Moscow (Pietromarchi) 
to MAEI, ‘Importazione petrolio’, 11 Oct . 1960 . For the laborious negotiations preceding 
the agreement, mainly carried out by Giuseppe Ratti and under the auspices of Italian 
Ambassador Luca Pietromarchi, see: ASENI – Fondo ENI, Presidenza Raffaele Girotti, 
b . 264, fd . 482E, especially ‘Missione a Mosca’, 8–17 March 1960; ‘Missione a Mosca per 
affare ‘Oleodotto’’’, 23–28 June 1960; ‘Missione a Mosca per ‘Affare oleodotto’’, July 1960; 
‘Missione conclusiva dell’’Affare Oleodotto’, Moscow, 14 Sept . – 14 Oct . 1960 .
14 NARA – RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1960–1963, b . 2695, file 865 .2553/7-1161, 
Foreign Service Dispatch, limited official use, ‘Petroleum – Notes of an Interview With 
Enrico Mattei by Time-Life Writer John M . Scott’, Amemb Rome (H . Gardner Ainsworth) 
to DS, 11 July 1961, pp . 1, 3–4 . On Italian-Soviet negotiations on the new agreement, see: 
ASMAE – Telegrammi ordinari, Russia (Ambasciata Mosca), 1961, vol . 55 arrivo (Jan . – 
Jun .), n . 898, 12 Jan .;  n . 1146, 14 Jan .;  n . 1395, 17 Jan .; n . 2416, 26 Jan .; n . 2889, 30 Jan .; 
n . 5014, 21 Febr .; ASENI – Fondo ENI, Presidenza Raffaele Girotti, b . 264, fd . 482E, ‘Missione 
a Mosca per acquisto greggio’, 14–19 Febr . 1961 . P . 7 .  
15 ASMAE – Telegrammi ordinari, Russia (Ambasciata Mosca), 1961, vol . 55 arrivo 
(Jan . – Jun .), n . 13, Itemb Moscow (Pietromarchi) to MAEI, ‘Stampa sovietica’, 2 Jan . 1961 .
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Surprise, Rage and Disquiet: 
International Reactions to ENI’s Contract
Indeed, commenting on the Soviets’ successful strategy of exporting oil 
and on its repercussions on US national security, the CIA affirmed that 
the Soviet system, by “beating Western private enterprise in competitive 
markets, would be used as an example of the Soviet system winning out 
over the American system” .16 Apart from its sheer commercial significance, 
the Soviet oil offensive had therefore a most important symbolic meaning, 
which could not but be detrimental to the image of capitalism as the most 
fruitful trading system . Expectedly, external pressures over Italy were not 
limited to the international environments; on the contrary, they extended to 
bilateral relations, and involved both administrations and private agencies . 
In November 1960, for example, Monroe Rathbone, the President of the one 
of the world’s leading oil companies, Standard Oil of New Jersey, solicited 
the State Department to make representations to the Italian government as 
regarding its Soviet deals .17 He was later joined in his protest by  executives of 
two other majors, namely Gordon Reed of Texas Gulf and Arnold Hofland 
of Shell . Reed addressed several recommendations to the US Congress, as 
well as to federal petroleum committees and the State Department, while 
Hofland intervened at the British and Dutch governments, and made 
contact with the US Embassy and services in Paris .18 In March 1961, US 
President John F . Kennedy’s Ambassador at Large, William Harriman, flew 
to Rome to meet Italian government officials and party leaders . He also met 
Mattei, with the sole result of having to endure the tycoon’s tirade on how 
it had been Western companies’ blind, short-term profit policy that had 
induced ENI’s Soviet deal .19
As mentioned, Italy’s trade with the Soviets, like Italian trade with Mid-
dle Eastern and North African countries that had been woven since the 
second half of the 1950s [Tremolada], were part of a strategy of interna-
tional expansion . By July 1960 Amintore Fanfani, the DC leader, was back 
in his seat as Prime Minister, and Mattei knew he could count on him . He 
had a further ally in the Italian Ambassador in Moscow, Luca Pietromarchi . 
Fanfani and Pietromarchi were sponsoring a general commercial détente 
with the USSR, and ENI was not only a part of this but its leading edge . 
The entire Italian industry – ENI was not alone in this respect – felt it was 
16 Quoted from: NARA – CREST, confidential, Memorandum for Deputy Director/
Intelligence, ‘Western Problems in Marketing Petroleum’, 30 Nov .1960 . 
17 ASENI – Fondo ENI, Estero, Rapporti commerciali con l’estero, box 2, folder 7E2, 
“Accordo italo-sovietico”, 23 Nov . 1960, Ruffolo to Ratti, translation of a circular sent by 
Standard Oil of New Jersey to their affiliates on 3 Nov . 1960 and 6 Dec . 1960 .
18 AN – b . 19900317/13, fd . 1, sub-fd . Italie 1955/1979, Note SDECE, “Derniers dév-
eloppements de l’activité de Mattei – Réactions qu’elle suscite”, 18 Aug . 1961, p . 3, secret/
confidential (FOIA n° 111 382) .
19 NARA – Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1961–1963, XIII, West Europe 
and Canada, Editorial Note, p . 798–800 . 
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being restrained by exclusively Western alliances, and missing out on an in-
credible opportunity to enter an untapped market [Bagnato, 2002; Bagnato, 
2003, р . 42–43] . 
On the Italian side, the Soviet dealings squared with Fanfani and Mat-
tei’s Neo-Atlanticist policy . Only by setting itself as a bridge between the 
West and non-Western countries, be these Arab producers or the Soviet 
Union, could Italy aspire to an independent role in the Atlantic setting, 
and avoid international marginalisation . Under America’s wing, Italy did 
receive protection, but at the high cost of neutralising its own autonomy 
in foreign policy . On the Soviet side, deals with the Italians were part of a 
larger plan, launched by Soviet First Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev, in May 
1958 . Khrushchev sought to strengthen the Soviet chemical industry and 
the production of plastics with the help of foreign technicians, machinery 
and capital . This is why the Soviet government not only approached Italy, 
but West Germany and the UK as well; in fact, it also planned collaboration 
with US industries [Bagnato, 2003, р . 60–62] . 
The American press joined the choir of protests against ENI . Antici-
pating accusations that were to be made in the following months, the New 
York Times warned about the consequences of the Soviet agreement for It-
aly’s position regarding the security of the Western world, while also rais-
ing some questions about the effectiveness of Italy’s contribution in the 
event of an international crisis .20 Would the Italians remain loyal to their 
Atlantic commitment, if they depended so heavily on Soviet resources? 
Possibly not, was the obvious answer . In the American press, as well as in 
National Security Council and State Department reports, dangers deriv-
ing from dependency on Soviet oil were always highlighted: for example, 
the Russians may decide to abruptly interrupt their deliveries following 
unfavourable political decisions by Western bloc governments . Soviet de-
pendency on Western technology, however, was largely neglected; dis-
continuing exports would have deprived the Eastern giant of part of its 
industrial power . This reason, more than any other, made an interruption 
of supplies unlikely . In addition, historian Angela Stent notes, the urgen-
cy of the American rhetoric was not commensurate to the real supply 
situation, in that Western Europe was not at the time heavily dependent 
on Soviet oil . Political factors linked to Cold War climate may have dis-
torted perceptions of the economic significance of Soviet oil exports, and 
may have joined worries by Western oil companies about a likely loss of 
market shares [Stent, p . 100] .
But national reactions to the ENI-SNE deal were not limited to American 
diplomacy and industrial environments . French and British protest was as 
vehement as the American one . When French diplomats were made aware 
of the ENI-SNE agreement’s negotiations, they made representations to 
Italy, but ENI responded with a short memorandum defending itself on 
20 TNA – FO 371/153362, fd . RT 1532/17, P . J . E . Male, Foreign Office, to J . Gwynn, 
Ministry of Power, ‘Italy and Russian Oil’ // New York Times article, ‘Italy Oil Deal With 
Soviet Weakens Her Ties to West’, 11 Nov . 1960 . 
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economic grounds, and returning French accusations to the sender on 
technical grounds . The Italian company maintained that Soviet crude oil had 
characteristics more suited to the needs of Italian refiners and the national 
consumption structure, in comparison to Saharan crude . The French, the 
memorandum continued, were trying to politicise a justifiable technical 
and economic issue, so as to favour their Algerian crude (see below) .21 ENI’s 
expansionist attitude also worried the French Ambassador in Rome, Gaston 
Palewski . When in late 1959 the Italian President, Giovanni Gronchi, was 
invited by Khrushchev to visit the USSR, Palewski was not so much anxious 
about an Italian-Russian rapprochement, as he was of the fact that Gronchi 
could be a beachhead for Mattei’s plans [Bagnato, 2003, p . 176] . 
In addition, ENI’s plans endangered British interests . In early 1959 
Mattei had taken initial steps towards the expansion of ENI’s distribution 
activities in the UK, where he aimed to conquer a quarter of the distribution 
market using cheap Soviet oil .22 However, this threatened the embargo the 
British had barely managed to have approved . Confronted with British 
Petroleum and Royal Dutch-Shell’s scepticism about Mattei, the British 
Ambassador in Rome, Ashley Clarke, reiterated his proposal that they 
begin talks with him . ENI and its President were not, in the Ambassador’s 
view, “passing phenomena which [would] conveniently disappear if the 
British Oil Companies avoid[ed] looking at them” .23 However, Assistant 
Undersecretary at the Foreign Office, Roger Jackling, replied that it was 
too early for companies to make life easier for ENI. If British companies 
came to terms with Mattei, he maintained, it would only encourage him 
to continue using his aggressive strategy, and escalate his requests to the 
majors . Moreover, Jackling speculated that ENI’s growing dependency on 
the Russians might be a source of embarrassment for the Italian government 
in regard to its Western allies, and the deal had also been very coldly 
received at the Second Arab Petroleum Congress held in Beirut in mid-
October .24 Things would fall into place by themselves, the British thought, 
due to Mattei’s overstretched and hazardous tactics . 
Anxieties expressed by diplomats with respect to the Soviet oil 
offensive were substantiated after the signature of ENI’s contracts, in 
mid-1961, when SNE’s President, Gurov, declared to a Soviet journal that 
the USSR meant to demolish the edifice the majors had built: “It should 
be borne in mind that oil concessions represent the foundation of the 
entire edifice of western political influence in the [less developed] world, 
of all military bases and aggressive blocs . If this foundation cracks, the 
21 ASENI – Fondo ENI, Presidenza Eugenio Cefis, b . 24, fd . CB8, ‘Promemoria sulle 
importazioni petrolifere dall’URSS’, 24 Aug . 1960 . 
22 TNA – FO 371/145054, fd . RT 1152, ‘Visit to UK by President of ENI-AGIP of Italy’, 
confidential, British Embassy Rome (Clarke) to Foreign Office, 15 Jan .1959 .
23 Quoted from: TNA – FO 371/153362, fd . RT 1532/10, ‘Relations between Signor 
Mattei and the Western Oil Group’, f . RT 1532/10 (A), secret, A . Clarke, British Embassy 
Rome, to R . W . Jackling, Foreign Office, 21 Oct . 1960 . 
24 TNA – FO 371/153362, fd . RT 1532/10, secret, R . W . Jackling, Foreign Office, 
to Clarke, British Embassy Rome, 4 Nov . 1960 . 
Problema voluminis190
entire edifice may begin to totter and then come tumbling down” .25 Thus, 
while American security and governmental authorities were trying to 
keep a low profile on the issue of Soviet oil, and prevented their anxieties 
from leaking beyond their offices, the Soviets were blatantly announcing 
their intentions . As a consequence, an alarmed Harry Kern, the Director 
of the review Foreign Reports, circulated a memorandum in July to 
top policy officials in the State Department and to the West German 
Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer . The document advocated an oil embargo 
against the USSR as a retaliation measure against its stance on the Berlin 
crisis, which the Soviet government had opened in June by issuing an 
ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of Western armed forces from 
West Berlin . The embargo, Kern suggested, would only end once the 
Soviet accepted “normal standards” in the marketing of their petroleum 
products .26 
He further advised that Adenauer, in declaring the oil embargo, point 
out that it was being put into effect not only because of Berlin but also in 
the interests of Arab producing countries . Adenauer should thus ask these 
countries to associate themselves with the defence of Berlin . An association 
of some Afro-Asian countries would be essential at the UN, especially at a 
time when these countries were receiving no support from the West in key 
international disputes .27 However, Kern’s proposal was not met with favour 
by State Secretary, Dean Rusk . A Soviet oil embargo was not discarded, but 
NATO authorities, to whom the memorandum had also been forwarded, 
believed it was too early to declare it . Kern’s proposal was a further indication 
of how much Realpolitik dynamics weighed in energy security . Economic 
interests were camouflaged under a political cover, and the Berlin crisis was 
used as a convenient excuse to justify a long-desired embargo on Soviet 
oil . It also shows the paternalistic attitude of some American personalities 
toward high charges of the West German state, which is a clear indication 
of the balance of power between the two countries .
American discontent was also clearly expressed in two documents 
produced by the US Senate, Soviet Oil in the Cold War and Problems raised 
by the Soviet oil offensive, in 1961 and 1962 respectively [Hoskins and 
Herman; Hoskins] . In the first study, authors Halford Hoskins, a senior 
specialist in international relations, and Leon Herman, an analyst in Soviet 
economics, warned that Soviet exports to foreign countries were “a political 
hand that has worn the economic glove” [Hoskins, Herman, p . 4] . When 
illustrating the Italian deal, the two authors maintained that if the Italian 
attitude spread over Western Europe, more countries would dislocate part 
25 Quoted from: Herman L. M. The Soviet Oil Offensive //  The Reporter . 1962 . 21 June . 
P . 27 . 
26 AHTOTAL – Fonds Total-CFP, b . 92 .26/31, fd . Pétrole soviétique, letter, Harry F . Kern 
(Foreign Reports, Director) to François de Laboulaye (CFP), 24 Aug . 1961 . 
27 One such dispute was the Bizerte Crisis, occurred in July 1961 when Tunisia imposed 
a blockade on the French naval base at Bizerte, Tunisia, hoping to force its evacuation . The 
crisis culminated in a three-day battle between French and Tunisian forces that left some 
630 Tunisians and  24 French dead .
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of their supplies from the majors to the USSR, thus causing fewer revenues 
to international companies . That would not only damage American, but also 
British (BP and Shell), Dutch (Shell) and French (Compagnie française des 
pétroles) interests [Ibid ., p . 6] . In Problems raised by the Soviet oil offensive, 
Hoskins went further to provide various examples of Soviet oil offensive in 
several countries in Asia, Africa and Europe, and their consequences . As 
for Italy, he warned that ENI’s policy was intended to eliminate as many 
foreign companies as possible from Italy [Hoskins, p . 11] . 
In 1957, a prominent American economist, Willard Thorp, had forecast: 
“It does not now appear that the new programs will place the Soviet Union 
in a position within the next few years to take over political control through 
economic domination” [Thorp, p . 282] . Not many in Western governments 
seemed to believe his argument in 1962, and it is doubtful they did even earli-
er [Spencer, p . 99] . Instead, a number of Western powers understood the time 
had come to stop Soviet oil exports by intervening on the very physical means 
the Soviet meant to use for getting oil flow into Western Europe: pipelines . 
The West Counter-Attacks to Stem the Oil Flood
The Soviet plan to build an extended network of pipelines from Russian 
oilfields to the rest of the Eastern Bloc (the western branch of which would be 
called Druzhba, the Russian for ‘friendship’) was greatly alarming to Western 
governments, especially to those that played a key role in the international 
oil trade, such as the US, the UK, the Netherlands, or expected to play such a 
role soon (France) . That is why ENI’s plans to build a pipeline for the Soviets 
between the USSR and East Germany, and a second one to connect Italy’s 
Adriatic Sea terminal in Trieste to a city 65 km away from one of the Soviet 
system’s terminals, Vienna, did certainly not improve Italy’s relations with its 
Cold War allies . While the Druzhba threat would be dealt with by NATO, as 
I will briefly mention below, the danger originating from the East German 
pipeline project was defused through international diplomatic pressure . The 
French and US governments had promptly been informed of the news of 
the Italian-Soviet agreement regarding the East German pipeline project by 
their secret services .28 The implementation of ENI’s project was depicted as a 
dramatic security threat to the Western bloc, as the very possibility of having 
an oil terminal in East Germany may sooner or later lead to its connection 
to West Germany . The State Department suggested the Italian Ambassador 
in Paris, Manlio Brosio, apply pressure on his government, and eventually 
28
 ASENI – Fondo ENI, Estero, b . 2, fd . 7E6, letter, Itemb Moscow (Pietromarchi) to ENI 
President (Enrico Mattei), 25 Nov. 1959; ENI President (Enrico Mattei) to Itemb Moscow 
(Luca Pietromarchi), 28 Dec.1959; AN – 19900317/13, fd . 1, sub-fd . Italie 1955/1979, secret, 
Note SDECE, L’activité de l’Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (mai 1958 – sept. 1959), 23 Oct. 1959, 
p . 5 (FOIA n° 111 382); NARA – CIA Records Search Tool Database (CREST), CIA Current 
Intelligence Weekly Summary, confidential, ‘Italian Oil Combine May Build Pipeline for 
USSR’, 28 Jan. 1960 .  p . 11; NARA – RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1960–1963, b . 2694, file 
865 .2553/1-2660, confidential, Foreign Service Dispatch, Amemb Rome to DS, 26 Jan. 1960 .
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the pipeline agreement was not finalized .29 ENI eventually supplied certain 
pumping and auxiliary equipment, while the plan to provide technical assis-
tance toward installing the pipelines was dropped .30
But there was still the issue of the Trieste-Vienna pipeline . This pipe-
line might easily be linked to Bratislava, where the Soviets planned to es-
tablish the Czechoslovakian terminal of Druzhba . Vienna’s short distance 
from Bratislava made the project a threat for supplies of Middle Eastern 
oil delivered by the majors .31 The Swiss newspaper, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 
sounded the alarm bells, by arguing in June 1961 that from a geographi-
cal viewpoint the Soviet project contained elements that made it more en-
ticing than a continued commitment to majors’ oil from the Middle East, 
transported through the Mediterranean . The proximity of Sweden and the 
Netherlands to the Baltic port of Klaipeda, where another terminal of the 
Soviet European pipeline was to be built, would make the Soviet pipeline 
a constant temptation for countries belonging to the Western Bloc, thanks 
to the savings its use would allow . Moreover from the Baltic port, oil could 
easily be carried to West Germany by railway . On top of that, by linking the 
Soviet pipeline to ENI’s planned pipeline, Soviet oil could reach the Med-
iterranean via pipeline, and thence be exported by tanker to areas already 
supplied by Anglo-American majors in Southern Europe, thus increasing 
the quantities that were already being delivered by tanker from the Sovi-
et Union via the Black Sea .32 The project for the Trieste-Vienna pipeline, 
however, was to be approved only in 1963 . The laying of the Transalpine 
Pipeline, as it would be called, was eventually to include a number of ma-
jors beside ENI . It was commissioned in 1967, while its extension to Vienna 
had to wait until 1970 to become operational .
Besides ENI’s pipeline projects, which had now been stemmed, the prob-
lem of oil exports remained: in the early 1960s, it became one of the core top-
ics discussed at NATO and the EEC . The NATO case has been discussed at 
length in other publications [Cantoni forthcoming a; Bagnato 2003, 380 ff], 
but it is useful to summarize them: between 1960 and 1962, NATO’s 
Committee of Economic Advisers discussed the possibility to embargo 
sensitive Western technologies that the Soviets may use for the laying of 
their pipeline . The debate, which lasted one and a half year, eventuated in 
the approval of an embargo on large-diameter steel pipes in November 
1962 . Unlike the NATO case, the intra-European debate on Soviet oil im-
ports, which kept the EEC busy for a few years, had much less stringent 
consequences on the policies of its country members: as I am now going 
29
 NARA – RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1960–1963, b . 2694, file 865 .2553/2-660, confi-
dential, Memorandum of Conversation, ‘Italian Government Guaranteed Credit for Soviet 
Pipeline Project’, 6 Febr.1960 .
30
 NARA – RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1960–1963, b . 2694, file 865 .25553/3-160, li-
mited official use, Amemb Rome (Zellerbach) to State Department, 1 March 1960; AN – 
19900317/13, fd . 1, sub-fd . Italie 1955/1979, secret, Note SDECE, L’activité de l’Ente Nazio-
nale Idrocarburi (oct.1959 – oct. 1960), 18 Oct. 1960, p . 15 (FOIA n° 111 382) .
31
 TNA – FO 371/153362, fd . RT 1532/6, f . RT 1532/6D, A . A . Jarratt, Ministry of Power, 
to J . T . Fearnley, FO, 17 June 1960,  p . 10 .
32
 ASENI – Rassegna stampa estera 1961, n . 39, para 370, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 11 June . 
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to show, it failed to fulfill the wish to stop ENI’s transactions with the 
Soviets at an early stage, and could not prevent the signature of a further 
Italian-Soviet oil contract . 
Not long after Italian-Soviet negotiations began in 1958, tensions re-
garding the policies to adopt as regarding Soviet oil exports started to 
mount in the EEC, as France’s attempts to prioritise its newly-found Af-
rican crude (notably from Algeria and Equatorial Africa) threatened to be 
frustrated by Italian Soviet-friendly policies . The establishment of the EEC 
in 1957 meant, amongst other things, the obligation for France to open its 
national market to communitarian oil . This, France partly did from 1959, 
but conditioned its extension to progress toward a European energy policy . 
French oil administrators wanted to be reassured by the European authori-
ties on a point they deemed fundamental, namely a common policy on the 
definition of the origin of products, lacking which nothing would prevent 
Italy from re-exporting to the Common Market its Soviet oil, since it would 
then be relabelled as Italian [Demagny, 210] . In the autumn of 1959, the 
French government proposed that EEC members adopt measures in order 
to protect the Common Market for crude oil, and in practice, asked its Eu-
ropean partners to prioritise the sale of Saharan crude within the EEC .33 
However, from a political point of view the French system envisioned the 
creation of a protectionist zone within the Common Market, which might 
lead non-EEC governments to retaliate by discriminating against EEC oil 
products’ exports, and applying duties on them . 
Unsurprisingly the plan met with Dutch, Italian and German opposition, 
as well as with US opposition outside the EEC (the Americans deemed 
the French plan contrary to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’s 
rules) .34 Eventually, US pressure had the French drop their plan .35 By early 
1960 the question of preferential treatment for Algerian oil was mothballed . 
While French companies continued to press the Common Market to 
make room for their oil, within the Community’s oil debates, it was now 
the Soviet oil offensive that entered central stage .36 Unlike coal – through 
the European Coal and Steel Community High Authority (ECSC) – and 
33 ADMAE – Séries: Affaires économiques et financières, Sous-séries: Dirécteur - Wor-
mser . N . 85 . DE-CE Papiers Dirécteur Olivier Wormser (microfilm P10747, pétrole dossier 
général 54–66, MAEF),  “Recherche de protection pour le pétrole saharien”, Director of 
Economic and Financial Affairs (Olivier Wormser) to Minister Economic at the British Em-
bassy of France (William Harpham), 29 Nov .1959 .
34 Quoted from: ADMAE – Séries: Affaires économiques et financières, Sous-séries: 
Dirécteur – Wormser . N . 85 . DE-CE Papiers Dirécteur Olivier Wormser (microfilm P10747, 
pétrole dossier général 54-66, MAEF), Wormser to French Ambassador in Washington 
(Hervé Alphand), 2 Dec .1959 . My own translation; AHTOTAL – Fonds Total-CFP, box 
92 .26/7, folder Écoulement du pétrole saharien, “Note sur la réunion du 9 Décembre 1959”, 
9 Dec .1959 .
35 ADMAE – Séries: Affaires économiques et financières, Sous-séries: Dirécteur - Wor-
mser . N . 85 . DE-CE Papiers Dirécteur Olivier Wormser (microfilm P10747, pétrole dossier 
général 54–66), MAEF, Wormser to Minister of Industry (Jean-Marcel Jeanneney), 12 Dec . 
1959, p . 2 .
36 AHTOTAL – Fonds Total-CFP, box 92 .26/7 Labouret, folder Sahara – Politique 
algérienne concernant le Sahara, “Observations au sujet de la note du 18 avril”, de Laboulaye 
(CFP) to Francis de Baecque (OCRS), 2 May 1961 .
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nuclear energy – through EURATOM – in the late 1950s, hydrocarbons 
were the only major form of energy the management of which was not 
regulated by a West European institution [Demagny, p . 305] . Following 
France’s African oil discoveries, the Soviet oil offensive and the surplus of 
oil on the market, it became necessary to devise a common hydrocarbon 
policy . An EEC working group of high officials was thus set up in April 
1960 to devise a common policy .37 The foundation of the working group 
followed a memorandum on the coordination of energy policies, devised by 
an inter-executive group formed by representatives of the three European 
energy commissions, namely the ECSC, the European Commission – EEC’s 
executive body – and EURATOM . 
The EEC inter-executive working group eventually submitted its 
proposals to the General Secretariat of the Council of the European 
Communities in January 1961 . These included harmonisation measures of 
the Community’s energy policies, and safeguarding provisions in case the 
energy market deteriorated .38 The former amounted to renounce the right 
to take decisions on energy matters before consultation with other EEC 
countries and the Commission itself . The second set of provisions, to be 
introduced over a period of three to five years, included: import quotas 
for coal, crude and oil products; custom duties on imported coal and 
fuel oil; and community-funded subventions to coal production .39 While 
acknowledging the necessity of a common energy policy, Italy did not 
adhere to the inter-executive proposals, which it deemed dictated by the 
majors’ vested interests .40 
With a view to the July 1961 oil experts meeting, the European 
Commission eventually prepared a draft intended to limit Soviet imports . 
It was based on a simple limitation of imports, with a retroactive effect from 
January 1961 . Each country would commit to self-limit its annual imports 
from the Bloc to the 1960 volume . If a member state wanted to import 
beyond that volume, it would have to consult its Community partners 
and the Commission three months before the opening of negotiations 
for additional purchases . The French Fuels Director, Maurice Leblond, 
criticised the far too generous flexibility given to states that wanted to 
37 AN – b . 19800118/3 CEE/Hydrocarbures, 1960-2, fd . Politique vis-à-vis des pays 
de l’Est,“Considérations sur les problèmes posés par les pétroles russes à l’économie 
européenne”, unsigned, 8 Apr . 1960 (FOIA n° 111 382) .
38 In January 1958, a unified secretariat was created for the Councils of the three European 
Communities, led by the ECSC’s general secretariat already in office, and named the General 
Secretariat of the Council of the European Communities . 
39 ASENI – Fondo ENI, Relazioni esterne, b . 29, fd . 2A89: CECA High Authority/EEC 
Commission/ECSC Commission, very secret, “Note au Conseil Special de Ministres – 
Propositions de premières mesures en vue d’une coordination des politiques énergétiques”, 
Jan . 1961 .
40 ASENI – Fondo ENI, Estero, Rapporti commerciali con l’estero, b . 2, fd . 7E2, Memorandum, 
Giorgio Ruffolo (ENI) to Sig . Giorgi and Sig . Carbone (Italian representatives at NATO Ad 
Hoc Study Group on Soviet Oil Policy), 29 Dec .1960 .
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increase their Soviet oil quotas, and suggested establishing a global EEC 
quota of Soviet oil that could be imported in the Community, and then be 
distributed according to countries’ consumptions .41 
Notwithstanding French opposition, the Vice-President of the European 
Commission, Robert Marjolin, proposed presenting the pilot study to the 
Commission, while suggesting its transformation into an official proposal 
to the EEC Council . The Commission managed to reach agreement on the 
principle of country members carrying out preliminary consultation with 
them, before trade agreements with third countries be concluded . In April 
1962, the Council charged the working group with performing a detailed 
study of the energy market situation and of the principles of orientation 
of the communitarian policy . 42 Two months later, the group submitted a 
Memorandum on Energy Policy . Among other provisions, a quota system 
for Soviet bloc crude and products on a communitarian basis was proposed . 
Such legitimisation-cum-restrictions meant that other operators would be 
assigned shares of the available Soviet quotas, thus limiting the Italian one . 
ENI battened down the hatches by suggesting that the Italian delegation 
try and obtain adequate guarantees for a quota, or reject the proposal 
outright .43
ENI’s President Mattei knew that Italian resistance to the quota system 
at the EEC could not continue forever . He thus attempted to negotiate a 
further agreement with the Soviets, and in September 1962 he sent an ENI 
executive officer, Giuseppe Ratti, to Moscow .44 Two days after Ratti’s return 
to Italy, the quota system was proposed by the Commission and sent to 
national governments for approval .45 ENI was skating on thin ice, but had 
an advantage: it was able to act much faster than the European bureaucratic 
machine . In the months following June 1962, the policy devised in the in-
ter-executive group’s memorandum was reshaped, modified and amended 
in order to accommodate each member’s interests, but no agreement could 
be reached within a short time, especially due to Italian obstructionism . 
Only in April 1964 was a Protocol of Agreement on energy policy was 
41 AN – b . 19800118/3 CEE/Hydrocarbures, 1960–1962, fd . Politique vis-à-vis des pays 
de l’Est, Direction des Carburants,“Note pour le Comité Interministériel – Politique de la 
C . E . E . vis-à-vis du pétrole des Pays de l’Est’’, 27 June 1961 (FOIA n° 111 382) .
42 AHTOTAL – Fonds Total-CFP, b . 90 .4/350 Ingérence russe dans l’industrie pétrolière, 
fd . III . Réactions du monde occidental, sub-fd . Organismes officiels Europe, “Bulletin 
quotidien n . 1025, 11 July 1961”; Fonds Total-CFP, b . 86 .12/20, Bobin, “La politique 
énergétique de la Communauté Européenne – Chronologie 1952–1970”, undated [TPQ: 
1970] .
43 ASENI – Fondo ENI, Presidenza Raffaele Girotti, b . 264, fd . 482E, unsigned, .“CEE – 
Contingentamento importazioni di petrolio dall’URSS”, 27 June 1962 .
44 ASENI – Fondo ENI, Presidenza Raffaele Girotti, b . 264, fd . 482E, Giuseppe Ratti, 
“Missione a Mosca (4–6 Sept . 1962)”, 7 Sept .1962; Giuseppe Ratti, Promemoria riservato al 
Dr . Cefis, “Operazione in abbinamento ENI – URSS”, 8 Nov . 1962 .
45 AN – b . 19800118/3 CEE/Hydrocarbures, 1960–1962, fd . Politique vis-à-vis des pays 
de l’Est, “Projet d’accord pour la coordination des importations de pétrole brut et de produits 
pétroliers en provenance des Pays de l’Est dans la Communauté”, unsigned, 7 Sept . 1962; 
AHTOTAL – Fonds Total-CFP, b . 90 .4/328 Vincent Labouret, fd . La politique énergétique 
de l’Europe, Europe Énergie, “La Commission de la C . E . E . et le régime pétrolier français”, 
25 Sept . 1962 .
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approved by a special Council of Ministers, far too late for the new Ital-
ian-Soviet agreement to be stopped (this was signed in November 1963) 
[Lucas, p . 36] . 
Conclusions
By analysing the consequences of the Soviet oil exports strategy, 
I have elucidated the extent to which it generated widespread fears both in 
Western diplomacies and the oil industry, and have shown the modalities 
through which a number of these countries tried to minimise what they 
perceived as a major threat to the West’s economic security . In this respect, 
ENI’s oil-for-technology agreements with the Soviets were a particularly 
acute thorn in the flesh, not only of Anglo-American companies, but also 
of French aspirations to supply the West European market with oil recently 
extracted from Africa . ENI’s alliance with the USSR was seen by the Anglo-
Americans and the French as a warning sign of what could happen if the 
Soviet oil offensive was supported by other West European countries . The 
threats deriving from Soviet exports became the chief bone of contention 
for Italy in bilateral and international organisations, and led to a number of 
harsh attacks to ENI and to the Italian oil policy by its Cold War allies . ENI’s 
Soviet liaisons were stigmatized as a critical breach of faith . The Italians, 
on their side, struggled to defend their position on economic grounds: 
that was only part of the real rationale, as a second, equally important 
motivation for Italian administrations feeling to narrowly constrained by 
US political diktats was the weaving of an international network of trading 
partners: a network that could also reverberate on Italy’s diplomatic and 
political prestige . 
As regarding the debate on oil exports, taking place at the EEC, the 
French position consisting in prioritizing its African oil on the Com-
mon Market clashed not only with Italy’s position, but also with most of 
its other European partners, and with Anglo-American companies’ inter-
ests . Ultimately, French diplomatic influence did not result in shaping the 
debate to the effect of formulating a strong communitarian policy in the 
short term . Italy’s dilatory strategy aimed at favouring ENI’s Soviet deal-
ings, and its long opposition to any restrictions to Soviet imports, allowed 
the Italian company to gain precious time to continue its trade with Soviet 
Union . It ultimately delayed the formulation of a communitarian policy 
on hydrocarbons until it was too late for the EEC to cause the failure of 
Soviet-Italian plans . 
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